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3. JAPANESE AND BRITISH VESSELS IN 
CHINESE WATERS 
Having finished my introdcictory remarks, I shall now 
take up· the main thesis of my present discussion. I shall 
first dwell 15riefly on· the characteristics of the Chinese 
shipping industry. 
From early times, China has led a self-sufficient econo-
mic life a:nd, naturally enough, she has shown a negative 
and passive attitude towards foreign trade in general. In 
China, foreign trade was termed "tribute trade" presu-
mably because goods were brought to China mostly in the 
form of tribute from countries· under Chinese subjugation. 
In China, the ocean-going vessels were placed under various 
rigorous restrictions and were of· very small importance. 
Vessels that had some importance were those engaged in 
inland and coastwise navigation, but they, too, were unable 
to maintain themselves against the successive invasions of 
the right of inland and coastwise navigation by the foreign 
nations who carried on their positive shipping policies ever . 
since the Opium War which offered the occasion of China's 
opening to foreign intercourse. But even under such a 
circumstance, China rather welcomed the coming of foreign 
vessels and their regular service in her waters_ For foreign 
vessels not only brought in a vast amount of customs 
revenue for the. benefit of the Chinese government officials, 
but they also served to suppress the pirates who ravaged 
the Chinese coast.') (This may be likened to the fact that 
1) Kuwataro Baba. Chinese Economic Geogra'phy •• (§iJIIl;\\'l!jjlf:l&i!IlilS. x 
. ii!i?,l:II,1) pp_ 246-7 . 
• 
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the silver coins brought to Chinese ports for. settling trade 
balances were gladly accepted by the Chinese,because these 
coins were far more convenient and enjoyed abetter credit 
than the Chinese native currencies which were highly com-
plicated and inconvenient.) Elated by the withdrawal of 
European vessels during the First World War, especially 
encouraged by customs autonomy bestowed through the 
Washington Conference, the Chinese shipping enterprisers 
attempted to recover the right of her· inland and coastwise 
navigation. But the creation of the Chinese shipping as 
a national industry was not easy, for it involved various 
perplexing problems concerning the development of Chinese 
modern industries. The persisting negative economic policy 
based on self-sufficiency in Chinese national economy, the 
impediment placed on the development of Chinese shipping 
by civil commotions and the inefficient management of the 
shipping business as testified by the China Merchant's 
Steam Navigation Company, were the major hindrances that 
stood in the way of Chinese shipping. In· ~his situation, 
even· if China had succeeded in-· recOvering the right of her 
inland and coastwise navigation, she would have not been 
in a position to replace. the foreign vessels by her own." 
Thus, until quite recently the Chinese vessels were placed 
in a much lower position than the foreign vessels in bot~ 
the foreign and external services as wel1 as the inland and 
coastwise services, particularly in the former_" 
I now come· to the central issue of my· present article. 
Just as in the case of Oriental waters in general, the right 
of shipping in Chinese waters was under the dominance of 
the Britiflh flag from early times. And, just as in the 
case of other parts of Oriental waters, Japanese vessels put 
up an active competition with British vessels in Chinese 
. waters. Immediately following the conclusion of the Shimo-
2) F. F. A. Foreign Shipping in Chinese Waters, Chinese Economic 
Journal, March, 1931, p. Z55. _ 
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noseki Treaty, Japan secured the right of inland and coas· 
twise navigation in China . 
. The japanese Depart~ent of Communications decided to 
give financial aid to both the Osaka Shosen Kaisha and the 
Daito Steamship Company in 1897 and 1898, respectively, 
for their service on the Yangtze River, and the continued 
government support was given to vessels engaged in inland 
and shipping in China. This, of course, meant a downright 
challenge to the established fight of British shipping in 
China. Despite this encroachment by Japanese shipping, 
British shipping was unshaken ~nd it maintained its superior 
position even during the First World War, and after the 
war the British vessels were ahead of Japanese vessels in 
Chinese waters. (See Table XIII.) 
Table XlII.') 
Percentages of Vessels in Chinese Waters, Classified by Nationalities 
Year 1905 " 1910 1913 1915 I 1920 1925 -
British 48.28 38.58 40.84 41.55 38.67 33.5 
Japanese 8.58 2129 25.10 26.33_, 27.04 27.4 
Chinese 22.55 22.08 21.32 "26.65 I, 26.52 25.7 
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
36.79 36.72 43.89 42.38 41.91 41.75 39.54 
29.32 " 26.90 14.60 14.68 14,34 15.22 17.18 
18.88 20.44 25.03 27.12 29.29 29.14 30.18 
-
Why was it then, that Japanese shipping was unable to 
surpass British shipping in Chinese waters, which, of all 
OrIental waters, are situated nearest to Japanese shores? 
The first and foremost reason may be found in the anti· 
Japanese activities in China. Such activities as the occasions· 
or the Incident of May 30th, 1925, that of the despatching 
of a Japanese army to Shantung in 1927 and the Tsinan 
Incident of 1928 had the effect of doing away with Japan's 
4) China Year Book. (lfij;filiJltt51-'lU\\f;II:ift1f.TlD 
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right of shipping in China. The effects of the Manchuria 
Incident in .1931. and the Shanghai Incident. in 1932 were 
much greater in intensity. , China, on the other hand, made 
her 'development: in shipping industry by excluding Japanese 
vessels. British vessels fared much better. Excepting the 
, dire effects-of the Incident of May 30th, 1925, the Changchi' 
Incident and the Wanhsien Incident of 1926, British shipping 
met no impediment in China and made a. smooth develop-
ment as shown .by Table XV. 
Table XIV.') 
Vessels at Various Ports in China. Classified by 
~ Nationalities (in 1,000 gross tons) 
. 
Tientsin - '. Tsingtao . Shanghai Hongkong 
Ports 
- 1927 1935 1927 1935 1927 1935 1927 1935 
British 1,234 1,391 1,000 1,733 9,020 12,526 16,961 12,510 
Japanese 1,864 1,739 2,956 2,817 8,791 5,806 5,857 5,332 
.-
Chinese B42 1,507 344 1,372 6,634 6,340 1,684 2,032 
Others 4,746 5,797 5,498 7,222 32,005. 34,027 33,572 30,706 
We do not attach a slight importance to anti-Japanese 
only because they are social and political in character. On 
the contrary, it may be said that in China social and political 
affairs play the role of greatest importance, as the facts 
shown in the following pages indicate, While Japanese 
shipping made a remarkable advance in' Oriental waters 
generally, as shown by the various table!) in Part 2 of this 
article, in recent years' especially after 1931, it met a big 
slump· in Chinese waters around the same year. It is im-
possible to explain this phenomenon apart from anti-Japanese 
. , 
activities, However, in addititon to this important cause,' 
we find another cause, namely, Japanese and British' economfc 
interests in China. 
Table XIV indicates the' close relationship existing 
between economic interests and shipping. It shows the-
5) Tetsujiro Furukawa, The Shipping Power of Britain in China (IPIOlI 
IC:liNt "'~lli1Ioc>mlm~:IJ). the Kaiun (mill!), Number 175. 
, 
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predominance of Japanese- vessels in North China and that 
of British vessels, iii Central' and South China. Taken on 
the whole, British vessels are in a superior position over 
Japanese vessels because Great Britain succeeded in colonizing 
entire China. 
~ 
The third and most fundamental reason for the supe· 
riority ,of British vessels in Chinese waters over Japanese 
vessels is to be found in the difference of shipping develop· 
ment of the' two countries which [explained in -Part I. 
While the activities of Japanese shipping have close relations 
with Japanese domestic industries, and accordingly oversea 
routes centering on Japan is its principal field; British 
shipping had already. outgrown such a stage and -had come 
to possess an international character to such an extent that -. 
it .upheld .. the freedom' of seas ", having extended itsac-
tivities over to the routes betweeri the third countries also. 
This comparative stand of Japanese and British shipping 
was also true in Chinese waters. Japanese vessels have 
dominated overwhelmingly in the China-Japan route. 
~ Early Japanese capitalism which has started in light 
inddstries attached much, importance to trade with China, 
partIy from political and geographical considerations, and 
established regular lines with ,China from early times _and 
gradually succeeded in driving out British vessels and attained 
the' present condition of prosperity. Inasmuch as Japanese 
trade with China has been carried on mostly by vessels 
having no terminal in China, it would be impossible to know ' 
the exact situation of Japanese shipping from shipping 
statistics. But, as far as the China-]apan routes are ~on­
cerned, JapaneSe shipping had an overwhelming sup~riority 
over British' shipping. In the case of other routes of 
China, however, British vessels always surpassed Japanese 
vessels. Its superiority over Japanese shipping was much 
greater in the case of China's domestic routes, as shown by 
Table XV. The ratio of superiority of British vessels over 
Japanese vessels is much greater in the case of 'domestic 
routes than foreign routes. 
I 
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T"hle XV.') 
Tonnage and Percentages of Vessels in Chinese Waters, Cla.sified 
by Nationalities (in 1,000 gross tons) 
_.Ioreign routes Domestic routes Total 
Vessels 
Tonnage I Tonnage I Tonnage I -. % % % 
(1932) 
British 18,803 42.21 40,628 44.71 59,431 43.89 
Japanese 9,333 20.95 10,443 11.49 19,776 14.00--
Chinese 4,337 9.74 29,551 32.52· . 33,888 25.03 
(1933) 
British 17,680 43.12 40,536 42.06 58,215 42.38 
Japanese I 6,657 16.24 13,511 14.02 20,168 14.68 
Chinese 4,561 11.12 32,693 33.92 37,255 27.12 
(1934) 
British' 17,460 38.87 41,407 43.33 58,867 41.91 
Japanese 8,598 19.14 11,541 12.08 20,139 14:34 
Chinese 6,811 15.16 34,340 ·35.94 41,151 29,29 . 
r (1935) 
British 18,542 38.54 41,571 43.36 '60,113 41,75 
Japanese 9,197 19.12 12,722 13.27 21,919 15.22 
Chinese 7,622 15.85 34,333 35.81 41,955 29.14 
(1936) 
British 16,158 35.72 41,187 41.28 57,346 39,54 
Japanese 9,419 20.82 15,495 15.53 24,914 17.18 
Chinese 7,335 16,22 36,836 36.91 44,171 30.18 
(1937) 
British 12,941 36.51 23,165 42.43 36,106 40.10 
. Japanese 6,797 19.18 6,018 11.02 12,815 14.23 
Chinese 5,791 16.34 19,797 36.26 25,589· 28.42 
. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS. 
I shall summarize here what I have so far stated. 
There are several reasons for the dominance of British 
shipping- and the backwardness of Japanese shipping in 
Chinese waters, The first reason is the difference of degree 
in the economic rights and interests of Japan and Britain 
in China .. The second reason may- be found in antj.Japa- . 
6) China Year Book. 
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nese activities which jeopardized our shipping activities in 
recent years. The last reason may be found in the difference 
of the stages in the development of shipping in the two 
maritime countries. While Japanese vessels predominated 
in China's foreign routes having Japan as their . terminal , 
British vessels were superior in all other routes. This is 
due to' Japan's present stage of shipping development. In 
other words, Japanese shipping was unable to make its 
penetration to the inland and coastwise routes of China. 
True, the Japanese economic interests planted on Chinese 
soil demanded the greater activities of Japanese shipping. 
, . However, viewed from the existence and development of 
Japanese basic industries, Chinese domestic shipping routes' 
were of secondary importance. In the field of '," shipping 
for £hipping sake ", Japanese shipping could never compete 
with British shipping. Although Japanese shipping made a· 
big stride, due fundamentally to the low living standard of 
the Japanese and temporarily to the depreciation .of the 
value of the yen, the present stage of its development is 
of the second type of shipping. British shipping has out· 
grown the second type and is of the third type. Partly as 
propaganda to secure government financial subsidies, British 
shipowners have circulated the report that they are facing 
a decline especially in Oriental waters, because of the ad· 
vance of Japanese shipping there. 
However, the fact is far from the wholesale retreat of 
British shipping or the wholesale advance of Japanese 
- shipping .. The advance of Japanese shipping is limited to 
those routes which. are essential to the Japanese basic in-
dustries, and in other foreign routes British shipping main· 
tains an unshakable foundation. In _ consequence, so far as 
the relative powers of Japanese and British shipping are 
concerned, Chinese waters are no' exception to Oriental 
waters or to the world shipping market in general. There 
isa difference in the case of China: whereas inland. and 
coastwise navigation in other (;ountries of the world is more 
or less prohibited by the laws, China has, however, no 
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monopoly of inland and coastwise navigation since the time 
of the Opium War, and thus she allows the navigation of 
foreign vessels on her rivers and along her coast. This 
differertce has enabled us to form a' clear conception of the 
relatiVe powers of Japanese and British shipping and their 
stages of development in Chinese waters . 
. Tbis, of course, does not mean that we consider Britisl:n 
and Japanese sbipping completely free from Chinese native 
resistance to foreign vessels: The increasing national con· 
sciousness on the part of the Chinese in recent years and 
the subjectivity of their policies, coupled with the national 
movement of industrial reconstruction which began around 
the time. of tbe woi'Id depression, bave been found ,in the 
various maritime laws enacted for tbe purpose of enlivening 
'Cbinese shipping." The movement of recovering the right 
of inland and coastwise navigation from foreign bands was· 
upheld on such occasions as tbe Central Political Conference 
of the Nationalist Party in 1929, the Shanghai Pan·Pacific 
Conference in 1931, and the Nanking Shipping Conference 
'in 1934. The start has been made for the reorganization of 
the China Merchant's Steam Navigation Company wbich has 
been cancer in Chinese shipping. circles. The cartel tnove~ 
ment for the purpose of industrial rationalization was alsQ 
adopted by Chinese shipping industry. Thus, Chinese ship· 
ping in recent years has been far from what it had been 
before; foreign vessels can not continue their former 
attitude of arrogance towards China. Chinese shipping is 
unwilling to remain in the first type of shipping any 
longer. Thus, in the words of Clark, .. tbe principal rivalry 
now is between the Chinese and foreigners as a wbole 
rather than between various foreignes."" . 
We are confronted by the necessity of revlsmg our 
viewpoint in studying the problems of Chinese shipping. 
7) Chu Chia·Hua, China's Postal and Other Communications Service, 
1937, pp. 114-122. 
B) G. Clark, Economic Rivalries in China. 1932. p. 41. 
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However, as far as Chinese shipping prior to the Sino-Japa-
nese Incident is concerned, it may be said with truth that, 
although there were the germs of a new and saner shipping 
industry, it was still under the control of foreign vessels 
which it was unable to overcome. It still is unable to 
outgrow the first type of shipping, and the Japanese ship-
ping as the second type. has competed with the British 
shipping as the third type in Chinese waters. 
I wish to state that my present article has limited my 
consideration to before the China Incident, because the main 
object of my article is to· survey the stages of shipping 
development for the three countries of China, Japan and 
Britain. 
I 
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